Europe dossier · Finland country file
Finland froze Rossotrudnichestvo’s accounts and secured the Russian House building as an enforcement asset for a Ukrainian compensation claim. A court has already authorised enforcement. Yet the institution has not been politically dismantled: the general cultural agreement with Russia remains in force, even though Finland can terminate it on six months’ notice.
Finland has gone further than Germany: the operator was sanctioned and the building seized to secure Ukrainian compensation claims. Yet Helsinki did not use the obvious foreign-policy lever — the cultural agreement, terminable on six months’ notice, remains in force, and the Russian House continues to exist as an institution.
| Centre | Russian Centre for Science and Culture / Russian House in Helsinki |
|---|---|
| Operator | Rossotrudnichestvo; administratively attached in Finland to the Russian Embassy |
| Address | Nordenskiöldinkatu 1, 00250 Helsinki |
| Agreement | General Finnish-Russian agreement on culture, education and research of 11 July 1992; no separate operating agreement for the centre has yet been identified |
| Opened | March 1977 as the Soviet Centre for Science and Culture |
| Measures | EU sanctions against Rossotrudnichestvo since July 2022; accounts frozen; narrow exemptions granted; property under seizure, or more precisely judicial attachment, in the Naftogaz proceedings since October 2024 |
| Current status | The organisation remains active online and in programme terms; regular public use of the building in 2026 has not been conclusively established; no Finnish closure order |
| Government rationale | No general explanation for the decision not to close the centre has been found. Exemptions were justified by the “basic needs” permitted under EU sanctions law, including taxes and essential building maintenance |
| Key feature | The property cannot currently be sold or transferred. A court has authorised enforcement in favour of Naftogaz, but the Russian appeal means that final disposal is not yet legally settled. The building has neither been vacated nor automatically closed |
The centre is Rossotrudnichestvo’s official representation in Finland. The Russian Embassy lists Nordenskiöldinkatu 1 as its address. Finnish reporting describes the centre as administratively subordinate to the embassy while institutionally belonging to Rossotrudnichestvo within the Russian state apparatus. Source: Russian Embassy Source: Verkkouutiset
During a five-day visit to Finland, Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin opened the Soviet Centre for Science and Culture together with Finland’s political leadership. Kosygin’s visit began on 22 March 1977. Source: EILEN
Finland and the Russian Federation signed a new agreement in Helsinki on cooperation in culture, education and research. It entered into force on 12 November 1992 and replaced, among other instruments, the 1960 Finnish-Soviet cultural agreement. Source: Finlex Full agreement
The agreement governs cultural and academic cooperation in general. It does not expressly mention the Russian centre in Helsinki. No separate bilateral agreement governing the institution or the property has yet been identified. Source: agreement text
The European Union placed Rossotrudnichestvo on its sanctions list. The Council described the agency as a central instrument of Russian soft power and hybrid influence that funds propaganda projects, disseminates Kremlin narratives and historical revisionism, and supports the war of aggression against Ukraine. Source: EUR-Lex
Funds and economic resources belonging to Rossotrudnichestvo therefore had to be frozen in Finland as well. Sanctioning the operator, however, did not automatically close its Helsinki centre.
Finland’s enforcement authority initially imposed a temporary prohibition on disposing of the property while examining whether it belonged to a sanctioned entity. The measure was lifted on 19 April 2023: the building belongs to the Russian Federation, not directly to Rossotrudnichestvo. The Russian state itself was not listed under the relevant EU sanctions regime. Source: Yle Source: Yle
Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs granted an exemption allowing the centre to pay almost €20,000 in property tax from frozen funds. Nordea had previously blocked the accounts and the money held in them. Source: Verkkouutiset
The Foreign Ministry issued further or renewed exemptions for what sanctions law defines as basic needs. These covered building maintenance and service charges for flats associated with the centre. Finnish companies consequently supplied electricity, telecommunications, lift maintenance, pest control and other property services. Source: Verkkouutiset
The exemptions did not lift the sanctions as a whole. They did, however, keep the property operational.
Finland’s enforcement authority placed the building under seizure again. This time the measure did not arise from the EU sanctions against Rossotrudnichestvo, but from a compensation claim brought by the Ukrainian state-owned company Naftogaz against the Russian Federation. Naftogaz is seeking billions in compensation for assets expropriated by Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Source: Yle Source: Reuters Source: Naftogaz
In legal terms, the measure is a form of judicial attachment securing the asset. It prevents Russia from selling, transferring or placing the property beyond reach. It does not, by itself, require the premises to be vacated, prohibit their use or close the institution.
Helsinki District Court ruled that the measures against Russian state property could remain in place. Despite Russia’s claim of state immunity, the court found no legal obstacle to the attachment. Source: Yle Source: Helsinki Times
The Court of Appeal rejected Russia’s attempt to overturn the continuation of the protective measures. The attachment of Russian property therefore remained in force. Source: Suomenmaa Decision record
Helsinki District Court authorised enforcement of the Hague arbitral award in Naftogaz’s favour. This goes further than any measure identified in the other country files examined so far: the building of a Russian House itself has become a potential enforcement asset for a Ukrainian state-owned company. Russia has appealed, however. Until the decision becomes final, the secured properties — including the cultural centre — cannot be definitively sold, realised or transferred to Naftogaz. Source: Yle
At the same time, the Russian House remained active at least institutionally and online. Its official Facebook page continued to advertise events, lectures and concerts in 2026, with some activities explicitly held online. Whether the centre still maintains a regular public programme at Nordenskiöldinkatu 1 has not been conclusively established. Source: Facebook Example post
The agreement commits both sides in general terms to cooperation in culture, education and research. It provides for contacts between cultural, educational and academic institutions, language promotion, media cooperation, youth exchanges and joint programmes. Source: agreement text
It does not grant Russia an express right to operate a Russian House in Helsinki indefinitely.
Article 12 provides that the agreement remains in force indefinitely but may be terminated by either side in writing. It ends six months after notification is received. Source: agreement text
Finland is therefore not permanently bound. It could end the general cultural-policy framework with Russia within six months, but has not used that lever. It remains unclear whether the centre also rests on a separate agreement that has not yet been located.
The land and building belong to the Russian Federation. The centre itself is Rossotrudnichestvo’s Finnish representation and is administratively attached to the Russian Embassy. Source: Verkkouutiset Source: Russian Embassy
That does not automatically give the cultural centre diplomatic immunity. Russia invoked state immunity in the Naftogaz litigation, but Finnish courts allowed the protective measures to remain in place. Source: Yle
Rossotrudnichestvo’s assets are subject to the EU asset freeze. The sanctions framework nevertheless permits national authorities to grant narrow exemptions, including for taxes, fees and essential preservation of frozen assets.
Finland’s Foreign Ministry used those provisions to authorise specific payments. It approved individual financial transactions — not the centre’s political or cultural activity as a whole. Source: Verkkouutiset Source: Verkkouutiset
Finland did not politically close the Russian House. Instead, it took a series of legally distinct measures:
Yle: April 2023 Verkkouutiset: exemptions Yle: October 2024 Yle: 2026 status
No official Finnish explanation for keeping the Russian House open has yet been found. The available statement concerns only the Foreign Ministry’s exemption allowing the centre to pay property tax.
„Poikkeuslupa myönnettiin EU:n neuvoston pakoteasetuksen edellytysten mukaisesti pakotelistattujen tahojen perustarpeiden tyydyttämiseksi, kuten verojen maksamiseksi.“
“The exemption was granted in accordance with the conditions of the EU Council sanctions regulation to meet the basic needs of listed entities, such as the payment of taxes.”
Later exemptions were likewise justified by essential needs such as building maintenance and service charges. Source: Verkkouutiset Source: Verkkouutiset
Finland is not a case of complete inaction. On the contrary: accounts were frozen, payments were scrutinised, and the Russian House building itself was secured for a Ukrainian compensation claim. A Finnish court has already authorised enforcement — a harder intervention against Russian property than anything Germany has done in relation to the Russian House Berlin.
But these measures belong to different areas of law:
Applies to Rossotrudnichestvo’s funds and economic resources.
Treats the Russian property as security for Naftogaz’s claim.
Finland has neither closed the centre nor terminated the cultural agreement.
The result is unusual but legally explicable: the accounts are frozen, the property is under attachment, narrowly tailored exemptions preserve the building, and the Russian House continues to exist as an organisation.
Seizing the property is not the same as closing the institution. In legal terms, the attachment preserves the building’s economic value for possible enforcement by Naftogaz. Politically, however, the crucial point lies elsewhere: the cultural agreement can be terminated on six months’ notice, does not even mention the centre expressly — and nevertheless remains in force.