Status
In-person operations suspended
Digital structure still active
Formal residual status unresolved
Core finding
Poland acknowledged that the centre, run by a sanctioned Russian agency, was spreading propaganda. It nevertheless refrained from closing it in order to protect Poland’s own cultural outpost in Moscow. Warsaw did not end the physical operation: Rossotrudnichestvo suspended it itself and concentrated some functions in Budapest, while the Warsaw centre’s digital channels remained active.
What the official map shows
On Rossotrudnichestvo’s current Europe map, archived for this dossier on 18 July 2026, Warsaw is no longer marked with a red location dot. That is consistent with the Russian announcement of a “temporary suspension”, but it does not prove that the Warsaw representation has been formally dissolved.
Map in the Europe dossier
At a glance
| Centre |
Russian Centre for Science and Culture, later branded the “Russian House in Warsaw” |
| Operator |
Rossotrudnichestvo, a federal agency subordinate to the Russian Foreign Ministry |
| Location |
Belwederska 25, Warsaw; in the building of the Russian Trade Representation, also used for diplomatic and consular purposes |
| Agreement |
Intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in culture, science and education of 25 August 1993; in force since 15 December 1993 |
| Opened |
November 1962 as the House of Soviet Science and Culture, initially at Foksal 10 |
| Measures |
No closure order by Poland. Public activity declined after 2022; the Gdańsk branch closed; a criminal complaint in late 2025 prompted scrutiny but no investigation was opened |
| Current status |
In-person operations suspended following the centre’s own announcement of 25 February 2026; digital channels still active; no published Polish closure decision; Warsaw absent from Rossotrudnichestvo’s current map |
| Polish rationale |
Reciprocity and protection of the still-operating Polish Institute in Moscow |
| Key feature |
Poland explicitly acknowledged growing Russian disinformation but kept the centre open as a matter of foreign-policy calculation. The later suspension of physical operations was initiated by the Russian side and occurred within a wider European retrenchment |
The centre was founded in 1962 and moved from Foksal Street to Belwederska 25 in 2005. In February 2026, the Polish Foreign Ministry confirmed both its affiliation with Rossotrudnichestvo and the shared use of the building with Russian diplomatic and consular services.
Source: Fakt / Foreign Ministry response
Timeline
November 1962
Soviet cultural centre opens in Warsaw
The House of Soviet Science and Culture opens in Warsaw, initially in a historic building at Foksal 10. No contemporary official founding document has yet been identified, but several later accounts consistently give 1962 as the opening year.
Source: Fakt
25 August 1993
Intergovernmental agreement expressly names both cultural centres
Poland and the Russian Federation conclude an agreement on cooperation in culture, science and education. Article 8 expressly refers both to the Polish Information and Cultural Centre in Russia and to the Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Poland.
Source: agreement text
Polish original · Article 8
„Strony będą udzielać pomocy w działalności Ośrodka Informacji i Kultury Polskiej w Rosji oraz Rosyjskiego Ośrodka Nauki i Kultury w Polsce. Działalność ta będzie regulowana odrębnym porozumieniem międzyrządowym.“
English translation
“The Parties shall assist the activities of the Polish Information and Cultural Centre in Russia and the Russian Centre for Science and Culture in Poland. Those activities shall be governed by a separate intergovernmental agreement.”
The agreement entered into force on 15 December 1993.
2005
Move to Belwederska 25
The Russian Centre for Science and Culture moves from Foksal 10 to Belwederska 25. It occupies part of the Russian Trade Representation building, which is also used by the consular section of the Russian Embassy.
Source: Fakt / Foreign Ministry
21 July 2022
EU sanctions Rossotrudnichestvo
The European Union lists Rossotrudnichestvo under its sanctions regime. The Council describes the agency as a central actor in Russian soft power and hybrid influence, funding propaganda projects and promoting revisionist historical narratives.
Source: EUR-Lex
From 2022
Public activity in Warsaw declines; Gdańsk branch closes
After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Warsaw centre sharply reduces its public profile. Its Gdańsk branch closes. No Polish order closing the Warsaw centre has been identified.
Source: OKO.press
2025
Return of propaganda and networking activity
Under new management, the centre becomes markedly more active. It organises film screenings, historical lectures, networking meetings and an off-site forum on Russian-Polish cooperation. On 4 September 2025, it screens the RT production “Russophobia: A History of Hatred”. The film presents criticism of Russia as an irrational, centuries-old hostility and promotes Russian narratives about Ukraine and neighbouring European states.
Source: OKO.press
Source: Rossotrudnichestvo
According to OKO.press, the centre also tried to establish Russian film clubs in Polish cities, connect pro-Russian circles and portray Polish criticism of Russia as “systemic Russophobia”.
5 December 2025
Criminal complaint after lecture attacking Poland
After a lecture accusing Poland of historical collaboration with Hitler and of systemic Russophobia, MEP Krzysztof Brejza files complaints with the public prosecutor and the domestic security agency, ABW. Prosecutors later refuse, in a final decision, to open an investigation. A petition calling for the centre’s closure gathers more than 6,500 signatures.
Source: Fakt
Source: OKO.press
10 February 2026
Primakov describes a broader European retrenchment
Rossotrudnichestvo head Yevgeny Primakov tells TASS that Russian Houses have had their work suspended or severely restricted in several European countries. He specifically mentions Romania, Denmark and Slovenia. Poland is not named in that list, but the statement shows that Moscow was already describing a wider European contraction before the Warsaw announcement.
Source: TASS
21 February 2026
Poland explains its decision not to close the centre
The Polish Foreign Ministry tells Fakt why it has not closed the Russian House. It cites the 1993 agreement, the principle of reciprocity, the continued existence of the Polish Institute in Moscow and the risk of Russian retaliation.
Source: Fakt / Foreign Ministry
25 February 2026
Russia “temporarily suspends” in-person operations
The Russian House announces on Facebook that its activities in Warsaw are being “temporarily suspended”. It gives no reason. Responsibility for directing Polish applicants to Russian universities is transferred to the Russian House in Budapest. At the time of reporting, Polish authorities had not commented on the Russian decision. The announcement came four days after the Polish explanation, but there is no evidence of a causal link. The transfer of functions and Primakov’s earlier remarks point instead to organisational consolidation within a wider European retrenchment.
Source: OKO.press
From March 2026
Digital channels remain active
Despite the announced suspension, the Warsaw centre’s official Facebook page continues to publish content, notices and Russian event promotions. The suspension therefore did not eliminate the entire digital structure.
Source: Facebook page
Example post after the suspension
18 July 2026
Warsaw is absent from Russia’s own Europe map
On the official Rossotrudnichestvo map archived for this dossier, Warsaw is no longer marked with a red location dot. Poland is also absent from the agency’s current central presentation of its locations. This indicates a genuine withdrawal from the visible network, but does not amount to proof that the representation has been formally dissolved.
Map and fact check
Legal basis
1. The 1993 agreement
Article 8 requires both states, in principle, to support the activities of their respective cultural centres. It also provides that those activities are to be governed by a separate intergovernmental agreement.
Source: agreement text
No such separate agreement has yet been located. It therefore remains unclear whether one was ever concluded, or whether the centre continued to operate on the basis of older arrangements, diplomatic practice and the general 1993 agreement.
2. Reciprocity
Article 29 places the cooperation on a reciprocal basis. This is precisely the principle invoked by the Foreign Ministry: the Russian House in Warsaw and the Polish Institute in Moscow are treated politically as linked institutions.
Source: agreement text
The Polish Institute in Moscow remains listed as an official institution of the Polish Foreign Ministry and continued to publish events and language courses in 2026.
Source: Polish Foreign Ministry
Source: Polish Institute Moscow
3. Termination mechanism
The agreement was concluded for an initial five-year term and renews automatically for successive five-year periods unless notice is given at least six months before the end of the current term.
Source: Article 30
Because the agreement entered into force on 15 December 1993, the current five-year period would appear, as a matter of calculation, to run from 15 December 2023 to 15 December 2028. That is an inference from the treaty text, not a published position of the Polish government.
The structure resembles the German operating agreement: automatic renewal combined with a six-month notice period. It is not an unbreakable legal bond, but a contractually defined point at which a political decision can be made.
4. The building and diplomatic use
The centre occupied rooms at Belwederska 25. According to the Foreign Ministry, the same property is also used by the consular section of the Russian Embassy.
Source: Fakt / Foreign Ministry
Closing the centre would therefore have been more complicated in practice than closing a stand-alone cultural venue. It remains unclear which rooms enjoy diplomatic or consular protection and whether Poland could have closed only the cultural section.
5. EU sanctions
Rossotrudnichestvo has been listed under EU sanctions since July 2022. The designation of the operator did not automatically close the Warsaw centre.
Source: EUR-Lex
Poland’s concrete treatment of the centre’s funding, staff, assets and events under sanctions law has not been publicly clarified.
Measures since 2022
On the evidence currently available, Poland neither closed the Russian House administratively nor terminated the 1993 agreement. The following steps can be established:
- a marked reduction in activity after the start of the full-scale invasion
- closure of the Gdańsk branch
- scrutiny of the centre’s renewed propaganda and networking activity in 2025
- referral to the ABW and public prosecutor following a complaint in December 2025
- a final refusal to open a criminal investigation
- no identifiable state intervention against the events resumed in 2025
- a temporary suspension of in-person operations declared by the Russian operator itself in February 2026
- transfer of student-placement functions to Budapest while the Warsaw digital channel remained active
Source: Fakt
Source: OKO.press
Awareness without closure
The Polish Foreign Ministry explicitly stated that it was aware of increasing Russian disinformation and other hostile activities directed against Poland. The decision not to close the centre was therefore not based on failure to recognise the problem, but on a foreign-policy calculation.
Government rationale in the original
The clearest official explanation identified so far comes from a written response by the Polish Foreign Ministry to Fakt in February 2026.
Polish original
„Doprowadzenie do zamknięcia RONiK w Warszawie może stanowić pretekst dla strony rosyjskiej do podjęcia środków odwetowych — próby zamknięcia Instytutu Polskiego w Moskwie.“
English translation
“Bringing about the closure of RONiK in Warsaw could provide the Russian side with a pretext for retaliatory measures — an attempt to close the Polish Institute in Moscow.”
The Foreign Ministry did not claim that closure was legally impossible. It made a strategic choice: Poland did not want to endanger its own cultural and informational presence in Moscow.
Source: Fakt / Foreign Ministry
Poland explicitly regards the Polish Institute as a means of presenting Polish perspectives to Russian society through culture, art and language. The institute remained active in 2026.
Source: Polish Foreign Ministry
Source: Polish Institute Moscow
Assessment
Poland is not a case of naïve inaction. The government knew what the problem was and itself described Russian disinformation as a growing hostile activity. Yet it tolerated a centre run by a sanctioned Russian agency because it feared losing its own cultural outpost in Moscow.
This sets Poland apart from Finland, Germany and Czechia. The issue was not merely a treaty left in force, but an openly acknowledged political exchange: Warsaw accepted a Russian presence at home in order to preserve a Polish presence in Russia.
That restraint is even more striking because Poland acted far more forcefully against other Russian representations. The Russian consulates in Poznań, Kraków and finally Gdańsk were closed in connection with sabotage attributed to Russia. The cultural centre was exempted from that policy.
Source: Polish Foreign Ministry / Poznań
Source: Reuters / Kraków
Source: Reuters / Gdańsk
1
Problem recognised
The Foreign Ministry knew about disinformation and other hostile activities.
2
Closure withheld
Poland wanted to avoid Russian retaliation against the Polish Institute in Moscow.
3
Russia consolidated the network
Rossotrudnichestvo suspended physical operations, shifted tasks to Budapest and removed Warsaw from its visible Europe map.
Poland did not close the Russian House. Rossotrudnichestvo suspended in-person operations itself and transferred university-placement work to Budapest. The announcement came four days after Warsaw publicly explained its restraint, but no causal connection can be established. Primakov’s earlier remarks about suspended and restricted Russian Houses across Europe instead place Warsaw in a wider retrenchment. The continued activity of the digital channels shows that Moscow withdrew the visible physical structure without necessarily dismantling the whole influence network.
Warsaw’s absence from the current official map shows that Russia no longer presents it as an active location in its visible network. Yet the word “temporary”, the continued digital output and the absence of any Polish closure order leave the formal residual status unresolved.
Romania suspended its centre because of propaganda. Poland recognised the propaganda but kept the centre in order to protect its own outpost in Moscow. The visible withdrawal was ultimately organised by Moscow itself: physical operations suspended, functions shifted to Budapest, Warsaw removed from the map — while the digital channels continued.
Sources
Official and primary sources
Direct government response
Investigative reporting
Map
Open questions
- Does the separate intergovernmental agreement envisaged by Article 8 exist?
- What precise legal basis governed the centre before 1993, and was it tacitly carried forward?
- Who decided on the suspension announced on 25 February 2026: the Warsaw management, Rossotrudnichestvo or the Russian Foreign Ministry?
- Was the Warsaw suspension part of a centrally organised European consolidation by Rossotrudnichestvo, or a separate decision?
- Did the four-day interval after the Polish statement have any significance at all?
- Was the suspension driven by organisational, financial or political considerations?
- Do staff or assets of the Russian House remain in Warsaw?
- Which parts of the property at Belwederska 25 enjoy diplomatic or consular protection?
- How did Poland apply EU sanctions against Rossotrudnichestvo to the Warsaw centre in practice?
- When and on what legal basis was the Gdańsk branch closed?
- Was Poland merely removed from the current public location map, or was the representation formally deleted from Rossotrudnichestvo’s organisational structure?
- Does the Polish Institute in Moscow continue to operate unchanged after the Russian suspension?
Research status: 19 July 2026
This country file distinguishes between a Polish closure decision, Russia’s suspension of in-person operations, continued digital activity and the disappearance of Warsaw’s location dot from Rossotrudnichestvo’s current map. Documents and corrections may be sent to
kontakt@antwortseiten.org.